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Introduction
Bubbles usually refer to asset prices that exceed the asset's 
fundamental value because current owners believe that they can resell 
the asset at an even higher price in the future. That is to say, the owners 
do not have to believe that the current price reflects the fundamental 
value. As long as there is enough absorption capacity in the market, 
a bubble can be persistent. However, classical models cannot explain 
the existence of bubbles, because if everyone knows that bubble will 
crash eventually, backward induction will leads to no bubble at all. 
This argument requires two things: all the traders are rational and the 
existence of bubble is common knowledge.
Bubbles are very often observed in economic history, such as the 
Dutch tulip mania of the 1630's, the South Sea bubble of 1719-1720 and 
more recently the Internet bubble in early 2000. Even Newton tried to 
ride the South Sea Bubble in 1720. He got out of the market at £7,000 
after making a £3,500 profit, but he decided to re-enter the market 
thereby losing £20,000 at the end. Frustrated with this experience, he 
concluded: "I can calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not 
the madness of people." This essay reviews a model of "the madness of 
people" based on Abreu and Brunnermeier [1], and extends this model 
from explaining bubble to overshooting crash.
Literature Review
There are four main types of models that justify bubbles. The first 
class of models assumes that all investors have rational expectations and 
identical information. These models generate the testable implication 
that bubbles have to follow an explosive path. In the second category 
of models, traders are asymmetrically informed and bubbles can 
emerge under more general conditions because their existence need 
not be common knowledge. The third strand of models focuses on the 
interaction between rational and irrational (or behavioural) traders. 
Bubbles can persist since limits to arbitrage prevent rational traders 
from eradicating the price impact of irrational traders. Lastly, bubbles 
can emerge if investors hold heterogenous beliefs, potentially due to 
psychological biases or information availability. This section will focus 
on the following criteria to highlight the model proposed by Abreu and 
Brunnermeier [1].
•	 Whether existence of bubble is common knowledge;
•	 Whether all traders are rational;
•	 Whether there is capital constraints.
To start with, Milgrom and Stokey's seminal paper derives "No 
Trade Theorem" under classical framework. If all traders are rational 
and the fundamental value is common knowledge, then no one can 
profit from private information because private information is revealed 
by price changes. The efficient markets hypothesis implies the absence 
of bubbles [2]. Allen, Morris and Postlewaite [3] develop "Contra 
Positives" of the no trade theorem highlighting necessary conditions 
for the existence of bubbles. If all traders are rational, but only have 
mutual knowledge (not common knowledge), then bubbles may 
exist. Similarly, in Allen and Gorton [4], they argue if all traders are 
rational, but there is asymmetric information, better informed traders 
can "Churn Bubbles" at the expense of the less informed traders. 
These literature justifies bubbles by relaxing the common knowledge 
assumption. Similarly, in Abreu and Brunnermeier [1], there is 
heterogeneity among rational traders on when the bubble begins. 
Traders are aware of the existence of bubbles sooner or later, but they 
do not know if the others are already informed.
In Delong, et al. [5], rational arbitrageurs push up the price 
after some initial good news in order to induce irrational traders to 
aggressively buy stocks in the next period. This delayed reaction by 
the irrational traders allows the arbitrageurs to unload their position 
at a profit. This strand of literature justifies bubbles by relaxing the 
rationality assumption. Similarly, in Abreu and Brunnermeier [1], 
there is interaction between rational traders and irrational traders.
Another paper written by Delong, et al. [5] find that traders' risk 
aversion and short horizons limit their ability to correct the mispricing. 
Shleifer and Vishny argue that professional fund managers forgo 
profitable long run arbitrage opportunities because the price might 
depart even further from the fundamental value in the intermediate 
term. These literatures assume that rational traders do not have the 
collective ability to correct bubbles because of their risk attitude or 
exogenously binding capital constraint. In Abreu and Brunnermeier 
[1], however, the aggregate resources of all arbitrageurs are assumed to 
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be sufficient to crash the bubble. The existence of bubble does not rely 
on the limited financial ability of arbitrageurs.
Assumptions
Following the comparison with the related literature, the 
assumptions of the Abreu and Brunnermeier [1] model can be 
summarised as follows:
•	 Rational Traders interact with boundedly rational traders.
•	 A critical mass of traders is needed for a bubble to crash 
("coordination").
•	 A proportion (K) of traders are needed to correct the mispricing.
•	 There is a dispersion of opinion among traders (sequential 
awareness), so the timing is important ("competition").
•	 Traders who get out of the market just prior to the crash make 
the highest profit;
•	 Traders who leave the market very early make some profit, but 
forgo much of the profit;
•	 Traders who stay in the market too long make a loss.
An important feature of the model is that there is both coordination 
and competition between traders. The coordination feature to burst a 
bubble is similar to the second generation currency crisis model [6]. 
Morris and Shin [7] introduce asymmetric information and derive 
a unique equilibrium by applying the global games approach. Both 
currency attack models are static in the sense that speculators only 
decide whether to attack or not. In contrast, the bubble model here 
assumes there is a dynamic structure. That is to say, the arbitrageurs 
also need to decide when to exit. Timing is very important, whereby 
competition is introduced into the model. The preemption motive 
leads to a unique equilibrium even under symmetric information [8].
The Model
To illustrate the model, we need to be clear about the subject and 
the object. The subject is the traders, including both rational traders (or 
arbitrageurs, speculators, etc.) and irrational traders (or behavioural 
traders, feedback traders, etc.). However, we can only study the strategy 
of the rational traders, and derive the equilibrium based on their 
behaviour. On the other hand, the object is the evolution of the asset 
price: when it starts to surge and when it starts to crash. The changes 
in price depend on the interactions between rational and irrational 
traders. This section will start with a general description of price during 
bubbles [9].
Price
The asset price pt during a bubble typically experiences the 
following four phases.
1.	 Before the positive shock (t:::0), pt grows at the risk-free rate 
pt=ert.
2.	 After the positive shock but before some random time t0 (0 < t 
::: t0), pt grows at a higher rate pt=egt.
a) This higher price is justified by the fundamentals.
b) The random t0 is exponentially distributed: ф(t0)=1 - e->t0.
1. After t0 (t > t0), pt continues to grow at g, but the 
fundamental rate is r.
 a) Fundamental Component: 
0 0
0
gt r(t t )
(g r)(t t )
gt
e e e 1
e
−
− − −= ≡ −β
b) Bubble Component: 1- e-(g-r)(t-t0) ≡β.
2.  The bubble crashes:
a) either endogenously because more than K rational 
traders are aware of the bubble (at t + ηk);
b) or exogenously because the bubble exceeds β -(at t + τ ).
The four phases are illustrated in Figure 1.
Traders
There are two types of traders:
•	 Irrational traders keep price above its fundamental level;
•	 Rational traders are sequentially informed of the bubble at 
some time ti after t0.
A key assumption here is asymmetric information. A rational 
trader does not know how many other traders have been informed of 
the bubble [10]. Since the traders only differ in when they are aware of 
the bubble. We identify the trader i by the time when he is informed 
ti. The posterior distribution for t0 for a trader ti is assumed to be 
exponentially distributed:
i 0(t t )
0 i
e e(t | t )
e 1
λ −λη
λη
−
φ =
−
The conditional distribution of t0 for different traders i, j and k are 
illustrated in Figure 2.
Due to the dynamic nature of the model, the trader's strategy has 
two components: the position of the stock (long or short), and the 
timing of taking the position.
Position: Each rational trader can sell all or part of her stock 
holding or even go short until she reaches a certain limit where her 
financial constraint is binding.
•	 The maximum long position is denoted as 0 and the maximum 
short position is denoted as 1 (continuous action space).
 
Figure 1: The four phases of price during a typical bubble.
 
Figure 2: Posterior distribution of t0.
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•	 Each rational trader may re-enter the market multiple times.
Timing: Each rational trader has to determine when to change her 
position from long to short.
•	 The selling pressure/strategy of trader ti at time t is σ (t, ti).
The aggregate selling pressure at time t is s (t, t0)=
}{ 0
0
min t,t
i it
(t, t )dt .
+η
σ∫
The crash time given t0 is T*(t0)=inf {t : s (t, t 0) ≥ k or t=t 0 + τ }.
The posterior belief of crash time is 
*
0
i 0 iT (T ) t
(t | t ) d (t | t ).
<
Π = φ∫
Like any economic model, the payoff function of the traders needs 
to be specified to describe their objective. The payoff of trader ti is equal 
to the expected execution price minus the transaction cost.
•	 The expected execution price at t is:
	 egt if s (t, t0) < k;
	 (1 -β) egt if s (t, t0) > k;
	 (1-α) × egt + α × (1-β) egt if s (t,t0)=k
•	 The transaction cost at t is cert.
The general specification of the payoff function is complicated 
because the trader can re-enter the market several times. For the 
special case that trader ti remains fully invested in the market until 
she completely sells out at t and remains out of the market thereafter, 
trader ti's expected payoff is:
i
t rs * 1 rt
i it
e (1 (s T (s))) p(s)d (s | t e p(t)(1 (t | t )) c.− − −−β − Π + −Π −∫
Equilibrium strategy
As we said, there are two components in the trader's strategy, 
position and timing. Therefore, we need to derive both in a trading 
equilibrium. The following definition, corollary and lemma are related 
to the position strategy.
Definition 1: A trading equilibrium is defined as a Perfect Bayesian 
Nash Equilibrium in which whenever a trader's stock holding is less 
than her maximum, the trader believes that the stock holding of all 
traders who became aware of the bubble prior to her are also at less 
than their respective maximum long positions.
Corollary 1: When trader ti sells out her stock holdings, all traders 
tj(tj<ti) also have already sold all their shares. ("cut-off property")
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, a trader is either fully invested in the 
market σ (t, ti)=0, or at her maximum short position σ (t, ti)=1. There is 
no partial purchases or sell outs.
The followings are related to the timing strategy.
Definition 2: The function T (ti)=inf {t σ (t, ti) > 0 } denotes the first 
instant at which trader ti sells any of her shares.
Corollary 2: The bubble bursts at T*=min {T (t0 + ηk) , t0+ τ }.
Lemma 2: In equilibrium, trader ti believes at time T (ti) that at 
most a mass K of traders became aware of the bubble prior to her. 
("preemption")
To summarise the equilibrium strategy, trader ti maintains the 
maximum short position for all t ≥ T (ti), until the bubble bursts 
("trigger strategy"). In the trigger strategy, all rational traders' strategies 
are corner solution.
Equilibrium crash time
The interaction among traders may lead to crash endogenously or 
the bubble will crash exogenously. The following proposition describes 
the condition of endogenous crash.
Under the condition
g r ,
1 e−ληκ
λ −
≤
− β
There exists a unique trading equilibrium, where all traders sell out in,
1 1 g rln
g r
 −
τ = τ − < τ λ − −λβ 
Periods after they become aware of the bubble and stay out of the 
market thereafter.
For all t0, the bubble bursts for exogenous reasons precisely 
when it reaches its maximum possible size/β . The intuition behind 
this proposition is that rational traders never burst the bubble if the 
dispersion of opinion (η) and the absorption capacity of irrational 
traders are sufficiently large.
Alternatively, the following proposition describes the reverse case 
when there is an exogenous crash.
•	 Under the condition
g r ,
1 e−ληκ
λ −
>
− β
There exists a unique trading equilibrium, where trader ti with ti 2: 
TK sells out in,
* 1
g r
1 e−ληκ
 
 
τ = β  
 
 
Periods after they become aware of the bubble and stays out of the 
market thereafter. All traders ti with ti < ηk sell out at ηk + T*.
The bubble bursts when
* 1 e (g r).
−ληκ−
β = −
λ
The intuition is that the maximum relative bubble size β* increases 
as the dispersion of opinions (η) and the absorption capacity of the 
irrational traders increase.
Application
The model proposed by Abreu and Brunnermeier [1] creatively 
explains why there is a bubble, i.e. when the asset is overpriced. 
However, it assumes that after the bubble crashes, the asset price gets 
back to the fundamental level. This is obviously not true in data. More 
often, what we observe in the financial market is that after a crash, the 
asset prices tend to overshoot, falling far below the fundamental level. 
It leads to persistent recessions or even depression as in the 1930s.
This overreaction in both upturns and downturns over the business 
cycles can be explained by applying the bubble theory too. In fact, if 
we assume the price after crash return to the fundamental level, it is 
inconsistent to the assumption of existence of irrational traders. The 
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explaining power of this model can be and should be extended to 
explaining the overshooting crash in addition to bubble.
Instead of assuming that the asset price returns to fundamental 
level after crash, we consistently assume the panic in the financial 
market will make the irrational traders think the asset price is much 
lower than the fundamental level. Assume the wrong growth rate is 
now g'<r, lower than the true rate. The asset price will not stop 
dropping at egt0+r (t-t0), but at pt=egt0+g'(t-t0) and this will continue.
Assume t1 is the time when the first rational trader become 
aware of the overshooting. Again, t 1 is a random variable following 
an exponential distribution. The same dispersion of opinion T exists 
among all the rational traders. Only when k traders collectively stop 
shorting the asset, the price will stop falling and return towards the 
fundamental value. This starts another cycle of bubble, just like 
business cycles in macroeconomics, but the cycles in financial market is 
more drastic and frequent. This extension enables the model to provide 
a symmetric explanation of the bubbles and overshooting crash.
Conclusion
The backward induction argument rules out bubbles from the 
terminal date, but these classical models assume common knowledge. 
Bubble can exist if there is a dispersion of opinions (heterogenous 
traders). In this case, existence of bubble is mutual knowledge, but not 
common knowledge because they do not know if the others know. The 
rational trader tries to "ride the bubble" to earn some profit before the 
bubble crashes. Therefore, the timing is a very important element in 
the strategy.
If the dispersion of opinion and the absorption of irrational traders 
are large, then there will be an exogenous crash. If the dispersion of 
opinion and the absorption of irrational traders are small, then there 
will be an endogenous crash.
The model can be extended to explaining the overshooting 
behaviour in both upturns (bubbles) and downturns in financial market. 
Expectation drives the price to fluctuate around the fundamental 
value but never stays, because the behavioural traders provide the 
opportunities for rational arbitrageurs to "ride the bubble" or buying 
"at rock bottom". However, the specification of this model implies the 
irrational traders are always losers, though not all rational traders are 
always winners. A more general model along this consideration could 
add in a distribution or dispersion of opinions within the irrational 
traders too. For example, some irrational traders are over-optimistic 
(those supporting the bubbles), while some are over-pessimistic (those 
supporting the overshooting crash). There are also a continuum of 
irrational traders between the two extremes, just like the dispersion 
of opinions among the rational traders. Under this generalised 
assumption, we can then explain more fluctuations of price behaviour, 
such as non-monotonic fluctuations in a bubble and double bottoms.
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